Sudan’s War And The Risk Of Destabilisation In Chad
Introduction
The protracted conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has increasingly evolved from a domestic power struggle into a wider regional security crisis. While international attention has largely focused on developments within Sudan itself, the conflict’s external spillover has become progressively more evident along Sudan’s western frontier with Chad. For N’Djamena, the war now poses a multidimensional threat encompassing direct security incursions, internal military fragmentation, humanitarian pressures, and renewed militant mobilisation.
The cumulative effect of these dynamics suggests that the Sudanese conflict is not merely destabilising Chad’s border regions but is increasingly testing the structural resilience of the Chadian state itself.
Escalating Border Violations and the Closure of the Sudan–Chad Frontier
The most visible manifestation of the conflict’s spillover has been a series of violent cross-border incidents involving RSF units operating in Sudan’s Darfur region. These incidents culminated in the Chadian government’s decision on 23 February 2026 to indefinitely close its approximately 1,400-kilometre border with Sudan.
The closure followed several escalating confrontations. The first major incident occurred on 26 December 2025 when a drone strike targeted the Chadian military garrison at Al-Tina near the border town of Tiné. The attack killed two Chadian soldiers and seriously injured another. While the SAF accused the RSF of launching the strike from Sudanese territory, Chadian authorities initially refrained from directly attributing responsibility but described the incident as a deliberate violation of sovereignty.
Further escalation occurred on 15 January 2026 when RSF fighters pursuing SAF-aligned Joint Force militias crossed several kilometres into Chadian territory near Birak. Chadian border guards attempting to halt the advance were drawn into a firefight that resulted in the deaths of seven Chadian soldiers. The incident prompted N’Djamena to issue a formal warning that its forces would not tolerate further incursions.
The immediate catalyst for the border closure occurred on 21 February 2026 during heavy fighting around Tiné. After launching a large-scale assault on the Sudanese side of the town, RSF forces pursued retreating SAF-aligned fighters into Chadian territory. The confrontation expanded into direct combat with Chadian troops and resulted in the deaths of five soldiers and three civilians. The incident demonstrated that the Sudanese conflict had effectively transformed the border into an active operational zone.
These events suggest that the RSF increasingly views the frontier as a porous battlespace rather than a sovereign boundary, forcing Chad to adopt a more defensive posture that strains already limited military resources.
Ethnic Dynamics and the “Kinship Crisis” within the Chadian Military
Beyond the immediate security threat posed by cross-border violence, the Sudanese conflict has exposed a deeper structural vulnerability within Chad’s political and military elite. Since 1990, the Chadian state has been dominated by the Zaghawa ethnic group, whose networks form the backbone of the country’s security apparatus.
The war in Darfur has therefore generated what is increasingly being described as a “kinship crisis”. The RSF, largely drawn from Arab pastoralist groups such as the Rizigat, has been accused of targeting non-Arab communities including the Masalit and Zaghawa during its campaign in western Sudan. Many of these communities straddle the Sudan–Chad border, creating strong cross-border familial and political ties.
This dynamic has placed President Mahamat Déby in a politically precarious position. While the RSF’s operations have directly affected Zaghawa populations in Darfur, the Chadian leadership has simultaneously maintained a controversial logistical relationship with the RSF’s external supporters. For many officers within the Chadian armed forces, this situation has created the perception that the government is indirectly supporting forces responsible for violence against their own kin.
Reports indicate that internal dissent within the military has intensified, particularly as fighting around the Darfuri city of El Fasher—a Zaghawa stronghold—escalated in late 2025 and early 2026. Some Chadian soldiers have reportedly deserted their posts to join SAF-aligned militias in Sudan in defence of Zaghawa communities. This attrition has weakened border units and further undermined the cohesion of the armed forces.
Strategic Contradictions: Chad, the RSF, and External Patrons
Central to Chad’s current strategic dilemma is its reported role as a logistical conduit for support to the RSF. Multiple reports, including findings referenced in a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) assessment in 2024, have indicated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has utilised Chadian territory—particularly the airport at Amdjarass—to transfer funding and military materiel to RSF forces in Darfur.
For the Chadian leadership, this relationship has provided significant financial benefits. The UAE has reportedly extended approximately USD 2-billion in loans to N’Djamena, a substantial sum for a country with limited fiscal capacity. The financial support has helped stabilise the government following the death of former President Idriss Déby in 2021 and the subsequent political transition under his son.
However, this arrangement has created a strategic paradox. By facilitating logistical support to the RSF, Chad risks alienating key elements of its own military elite while simultaneously provoking hostility from the SAF and their regional allies.
The Sudanese military leadership has increasingly accused Chad of serving as the logistical lung through which the RSF sustains its war effort. In response, SAF-aligned networks have reportedly revived ties with Chadian rebel movements in an attempt to exert pressure on the Déby administration. This dynamic mirrors the proxy warfare cycles that characterised relations between Sudan and Chad during the 2005–2010 period.
Rebel Resurgence and the Re-Militarisation of Chadian Insurgents
The Sudanese conflict has also provided new opportunities for Chadian militant groups to rearm and reorganise. The 2022 Doha Peace Agreement, mediated by Qatar, was intended to disarm rebel factions ahead of Chad’s political transition. While the agreement reduced the number of active insurgent groups, several organisations refused to sign or later splintered from the process.
Among the most prominent is the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the group responsible for the offensive that resulted in the death of former President Idriss Déby in 2021. Elements of FACT, along with fighters from other factions such as the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR), have reportedly relocated to Sudan where they are participating in the ongoing conflict.
These militants’ alignment with the RSF is widely viewed as transactional. By fighting in Sudan, they gain access to modern weaponry, operational funding, and combat experience that would otherwise be unavailable.
Once the Sudanese battlefield stabilises, these fighters may redirect their newly acquired capabilities towards Chad itself. The result could be a significantly more capable insurgent threat than the rebellions that challenged the Chadian state in previous decades.
Internal Political Fragility and Elite Fragmentation
Compounding these security risks is growing instability within Chad’s domestic political environment. President Mahamat Déby formally consolidated power through a 2024 election and constitutional reforms in 2025 that extended presidential terms and removed term limits. However, these measures have not eliminated internal opposition.
One of the most significant challenges stems from divisions within the ruling Zaghawa elite. Following the killing of opposition figure Yaya Dillo in 2024, his brother Ousmane Dillo emerged as a prominent insurgent figure and has reportedly aligned with SAF-linked forces in Darfur while declaring his intention to overthrow the Chadian government.
The administration has responded with repeated military purges, including the dismissal of senior officers suspected of disloyalty. Even members of the president’s extended family have been removed from key positions, underscoring the depth of mistrust within the ruling network.
Additional signs of fragility emerged in January 2025 when armed attackers targeted the presidential palace in N’Djamena. Although authorities dismissed the perpetrators as disorganised criminals, the incident exposed vulnerabilities in the capital’s security architecture.
Strategic Outlook: A Narrow Corridor of Stability
Taken together, these developments suggest that Chad is entering one of the most precarious security environments in its recent history. The government faces simultaneous pressures from cross-border military incursions, a deteriorating ethnic balance within the armed forces, and the gradual reconstitution of insurgent networks.
President Déby’s decision to close the Sudanese border may represent an attempt to recalibrate this delicate balance. By signalling opposition to RSF incursions and emphasising territorial sovereignty, the government may hope to reassure discontented military factions and reduce the risk of an internal revolt.
However, this strategy carries significant risks. A genuine break with the RSF’s external backers could jeopardise critical financial support, while continued association with RSF supply networks risks deepening internal dissent and inviting retaliation from Sudanese or rebel actors.
The trajectory of the Sudanese conflict is therefore expected to remain a decisive factor in Chad’s stability. If violence in Darfur continues to intensify, the pressures currently straining the Chadian state could converge into a broader crisis. In such a scenario, Chad may not simply experience spillover from Sudan’s war but could become an active secondary theatre of the conflict itself.
