Introduction
Building upon the foundational and intermediate analyses in this series—where Articles 1 and 2 defined the composition, evolution, and internal dynamics of BRICS and the West, Article 3 examined their historical context amid Africa’s colonial legacy, Article 4 outlined the economic, political, and strategic stakes for Africa, and Article 5 delved into the geopolitical contest of great power competition on the continent—this sixth instalment shifts to country-level alignments. As BRICS expands to include eleven full members by 2025, with African nations such as South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia among them, and the West maintains its institutional networks through entities like the European Union (EU) and NATO, individual African states exhibit varied positions in navigating these blocs. This diversity reflects national priorities, historical ties, and aspirations for sovereignty, often balancing engagements to advance development goals under frameworks like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Agenda 2063.
From an African perspective, these alignments are neither rigid nor binary; they represent pragmatic strategies to leverage opportunities while mitigating risks, such as dependency or geopolitical entrapment. Drawing on data from the African Union (AU), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and recent developments as of October 2025, this article analyses the positions of key African nations, including BRICS members (South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia), partner countries or aspirants (Nigeria, Algeria, Kenya), and those with stronger Western orientations (Morocco). This examination highlights how national strategies contribute to broader continental agency, setting the stage for discussions on regional bodies in the subsequent article.
BRICS Members
African representation in BRICS has grown significantly with the bloc’s 2024 expansion, providing these nations platforms to amplify their voices in global governance while maintaining diversified ties with the West. South Africa, as the first African member, exemplifies balanced engagement, whereas Egypt and Ethiopia, newer entrants, focus on economic and diplomatic gains.
South Africa’s position in BRICS dates to its inclusion in 2010, positioning it as a gateway for African interests within the group. By 2025, hosting the G20 Summit has underscored its role in bridging Global South and Western agendas, advocating for reforms in institutions like the United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organisation (WTO). Economically, South Africa benefits from BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB) funding for infrastructure, with over USD 5-billion allocated to projects in renewable energy and transport by mid-2025. Politically, it leverages BRICS to counter Western dominance, as seen in its support for de-dollarisation at the July 2025 Rio Summit, where it pushed for increased local currency trade to shield against US sanctions and volatility. However, South Africa maintains robust Western ties: trade with the EU accounts for 25% of its exports, and it participates in AGOA (Africa Growth and Opportunity Act) with the US, extended through 2025—expiring 30 September 2025. This duality allows South Africa to negotiate better terms, such as EU investments in green hydrogen, while using BRICS to diversify amid internal challenges like energy crises. From an African lens, South Africa’s approach models how membership can enhance continental bargaining power without severing Western links.
Egypt, joining as a full member on 01 January 2024, views BRICS as a vehicle for economic diversification amid domestic challenges like inflation and debt. By October 2025, Egypt has actively participated in BRICS summits, including the Rio gathering, where it advocated for enhanced trade corridors linking Africa and Asia. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments, exceeding USD 20-billion in Suez Canal expansions and industrial zones, align with BRICS objectives, bolstering Egypt’s role in global supply chains. Russia’s nuclear cooperation, including the El Dabaa plant operational by 2025, further strengthens ties. Yet, Egypt balances this with Western engagements: as a major US aid recipient (receiving USD 1.3-billion annually in military assistance), it coordinates with NATO on Mediterranean security and benefits from EU trade agreements covering 30% of its exports. This strategic hedging mitigates risks from regional tensions, such as in the Nile Basin, and supports Agenda 2063 by fostering technology transfers. Egypt’s membership amplifies North African perspectives in BRICS, promoting south-south solidarity while preserving Western economic lifelines.
Ethiopia’s accession to BRICS in January 2024 has served as an impetus for economic growth, particularly in infrastructure and diplomacy. Hosting the AU headquarters, Ethiopia utilises BRICS to lobby for global reforms, including a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for 2025–2026, as highlighted at the Rio Summit. NDB financing has supported the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), enhancing energy self-sufficiency, while trade with BRICS nations—led by China’s USD 4-billion investments in railways—has grown 15% year-on-year by 2025. Russia’s agricultural deals aid food security amid droughts. Concurrently, Ethiopia engages the West: World Bank loans totalling USD 3-billion in 2025 support macroeconomic reforms, and US partnerships focus on counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa. This balanced stance addresses historical vulnerabilities, such as colonial-era dependencies noted in Article 3, and aligns with AfCFTA by boosting intra-African exports. Ethiopia’s position underscores BRICS’ role in empowering landlocked nations through alternative financing, fostering African agency in multipolar dynamics.
Partner Countries and Aspirants
Beyond full members, several African states engage BRICS as partners or aspirants, seeking economic benefits while upholding non-alignment, often to counterbalance Western influences.
Nigeria, admitted as a BRICS partner country in January 2025—the ninth such nation—attended its first summit in Rio, signalling a shift towards diversified alliances. As Africa’s largest economy, Nigeria prioritises BRICS for access to markets representing 40% of global GDP, with potential gains in oil trade and infrastructure. By October 2025, partnerships have facilitated de-dollarised transactions with Russia and China, reducing vulnerability to US sanctions on its banking sector. India’s pharmaceutical investments, exceeding USD 2-billion, support health security. However, Nigeria maintains strong Western ties: the UK and US are key FDI sources (USD 5-billion combined in 2025), and it participates in ECOWAS-EU economic partnerships. This non-aligned stance, rooted in post-colonial history, allows Nigeria to negotiate debt relief from the IMF while exploring NDB membership. For Africa, Nigeria’s partnership exemplifies leveraging BRICS to address stakes outlined in Article 4, such as trade imbalances, without compromising sovereignty.
Algeria, while declining full BRICS membership in early 2025 after an unsuccessful 2023 application, joined the NDB in May 2025 to finance energy and infrastructure projects. This selective engagement reflects priorities in natural gas exports, with BRICS ties enhancing deals with China and India amid Europe’s energy diversification from Russia. By mid-2025, NDB approval for USD 1-billion in solar projects aligns with Algeria’s green transition. Western relations remain pivotal: as an EU gas supplier, Algeria benefits from trade agreements covering 50% of exports, and US military cooperation counters Sahel instability. Algeria’s approach avoids deeper geopolitical entanglements, focusing on economic pragmatism, which supports Pan-African initiatives by reducing dependency on colonial-era ties.
Kenya has expressed interest in BRICS membership since mid-2025, viewing it as a means to diversify from Western dependencies. President William Ruto’s announcements emphasise access to BRICS’ economic network for trade in agriculture and technology, with potential partnerships in China’s BRI for port expansions. By October 2025, exploratory talks have advanced, aligning with Kenya’s foreign policy of multi-alignment. Nonetheless, Western ties dominate: the US designates Kenya a major non-NATO ally in 2025 for counterterrorism, and EU investments in digital infrastructure exceed USD 1-billion. This balancing act mitigates risks from great power competition, promoting AfCFTA integration through enhanced east-west trade corridors.
Western-Aligned Nations: Morocco as a Case Study
Morocco exemplifies African states with stronger Western alignments, yet showing interest in BRICS elements for strategic depth. A US ally since 1786, Morocco benefits from free trade agreements and military aid (USD 500-million in 2025), coordinating with NATO on North African security. EU partnerships, including migration deals, account for 60% of trade. However, by 2025, Morocco has engaged the NDB for potential membership, seeking financing for phosphate and renewable projects amid eastward shifts. Interest in BRICS, expressed in July 2025, aims to diversify without alienating the West, reflecting multipolar adaptations. This position highlights opportunities for African agency, using Western stability to negotiate BRICS benefits.
A comparative table summarises these alignments:
| Country | BRICS Status | Key BRICS Engagements | Key Western Engagements | Implications for Africa |
| South Africa | Full Member (2010) | NDB funding, de-dollarisation advocacy | EU trade (25% exports), AGOA with US | Bridges blocs, amplifies continental voice |
| Egypt | Full Member (2024) | BRI investments, summits participation | US military aid, EU trade agreements | Enhances North African trade corridors |
| Ethiopia | Full Member (2024) | GERD financing, UN reform lobbying | World Bank loans, US counterterrorism | Boosts energy sovereignty, diplomatic leverage |
| Nigeria | Partner (2025) | De-dollarised trade, summit attendance | UK/US FDI, ECOWAS-EU partnerships | Diversifies economy, maintains non-alignment |
| Algeria | NDB Member (2025) | Energy projects financing | EU gas exports, US military cooperation | Selective engagement for resource management |
| Kenya | Aspirant (2025) | Exploratory BRI talks | US non-NATO ally, EU digital investments | Reduces Western dependency, fosters trade |
| Morocco | NDB Aspirant (2025) | Potential infrastructure financing | US trade/military aid, EU migration deals | Strategic hedging in multipolarity |
Sources: AU reports, CFR, Carnegie Endowment.
Implications for African Self-Reliance
These country-level positions underscore Africa’s drive for self-reliance, as engagements with BRICS and the West complement AfCFTA and Agenda 2063. BRICS memberships enable technology transfers and alternative financing, reducing debt vulnerabilities from Western conditionalities. However, risks include internal bloc tensions (Article 2) spilling over, potentially fragmenting African unity. By prioritising national interests, states like Nigeria and Kenya exemplify how diversified alignments can catalyse intra-continental trade, projected to reach 52% by 2045, transforming competition into development opportunities.
Conclusion
African nations’ alignments with BRICS and the West reveal a mosaic of strategic pragmatism, from full memberships amplifying global influence on partnerships mitigating dependencies. This diversity strengthens continental agency, allowing states to navigate multipolarity while advancing sovereignty. As explored, these positions build on the geopolitical contest and inform collective strategies. Next, we will examine regional bodies like the AU and ECOWAS, analysing how they facilitate unified African responses in this landscape.
