Background
A strong El Niño event is developing in the tropical Pacific and is forecast to intensify through the remainder of 2026 and into early 2027. Sea-surface temperature anomalies in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific have increased significantly, with official forecasts indicating an approximately 81 per cent probability of a very strong event during the October–December 2026 peak period and a 97 per cent likelihood that El Niño conditions will persist into early spring 2027. Some multi-model ensembles suggest the event could rank among the strongest on record or potentially exceed previous peaks. Although “super El Niño” is not an official World Meteorological Organization (WMO) classification, the term is increasingly being used to describe the projected intensity.
The warning, delivered in late July 2026 by African Development Bank (AfDB) Director for Climate Change and Green Growth Anthony Nyong, frames the event as a force multiplier for existing economic, fiscal and security vulnerabilities. Droughts, flooding and severe storms could compound pressure on government revenues, infrastructure investment and financial-sector stability in economies with limited fiscal buffers. El Niño impacts vary by region and season, producing drought in some areas and excessive rainfall in others, often accompanied by extreme heat.
Regional Climate Patterns
Southern Africa is forecast to experience below-average rainfall and above-normal temperatures during the October–March rainy season, increasing the risk of drought, declining soil moisture and heat stress during critical crop-growth periods. The region is still recovering from the severe 2023–24 drought, which resulted in national disaster declarations in six countries and left tens of millions facing acute food insecurity.
Eastern Africa faces a mixed outlook. Western and central areas, including parts of Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan, have an elevated probability of below-average rainfall during June–September. Meanwhile, the eastern Horn of Africa could experience stronger October–December short rains, increasing the risk of flooding, landslides and infrastructure damage. Extreme heat is expected to compound both scenarios.
West Africa and the Sahel have less consistent regional signals, although erratic rainfall and high temperatures remain concerns, particularly where conflict and high input costs are already limiting agricultural recovery. Above-normal temperatures are expected across much of the continent, increasing the likelihood of heatwaves affecting human health, livestock and electricity generation. These risks are emerging alongside elevated global energy and fertiliser prices linked to geopolitical disruptions, further straining heavily rain-fed agricultural systems.
Security Risks in Fragile States
Security implications are likely to be most pronounced in already fragile states. The AfDB has identified Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Mali, Burundi and Nigeria among countries facing particularly severe exposure due to overlapping conflict, political instability and constrained state capacity.
Drought, flooding and agricultural losses could intensify competition over water, grazing land and arable resources, while higher staple prices could deepen social tensions and increase pressure on humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Climate-driven displacement could also place additional pressure on urban centres, border areas and transport corridors, with effects spilling into neighbouring markets.
A severe El Niño would therefore function as a force multiplier rather than a discrete climate event, with food and water insecurity, infrastructure disruption, fiscal stress and population movement potentially amplifying instability.
Economic and Business Impact
Agricultural losses, infrastructure damage and disrupted logistics would reduce economic output in the countries most exposed. With African growth forecasts already moderated by global supply-chain and energy shocks, a strong El Niño presents an additional downside risk through lower agricultural incomes, increased emergency expenditure and damage to roads, electricity and water infrastructure.
Governments with limited fiscal space may have to divert resources from longer-term investment in health, education and productive infrastructure towards disaster relief and reconstruction. Damage to critical assets could also weaken debt-servicing capacity and financial-sector stability, slowing recovery and constraining development.
Business continuity risks extend beyond agriculture. Disruptions to electricity, water, transport and logistics could affect industrial activity and regional value chains, while climate-related displacement could complicate personnel movements and reduce labour availability along important trade and transport corridors.
Southern Africa, still recovering from the 2023–24 drought, faces renewed below-average rainfall risks during the 2026–27 season. Eastern Africa could experience contrasting flooding and dryness, while impacts in West Africa are expected to be more localised but will interact with existing conflict and high input costs.
South African authorities have also highlighted inflationary risks. The South African Reserve Bank has warned that an El Niño-related drought could affect the next agricultural season and keep food-price pressures elevated, even if other global factors temporarily moderate inflation.
African-Led Response
African institutions have moved to strengthen preparedness. On 30 July 2026, the African Union Commission (AUC) convened an Extraordinary Specialised Technical Committee meeting in Addis Ababa focused on continental preparedness and response. Commissioner Moses Vilakati said scientific projections indicate a high probability of a super El Niño peaking between November 2026 and February 2027, potentially making it the strongest event since 1950.
The meeting drew on lessons from 2023–24, when six southern African countries declared national disasters and the Southern African Development Community issued a USD 5.5-billion humanitarian appeal covering more than 71 million people. Agricultural production declined, hydropower generation was disrupted and food insecurity intensified, while devastating floods in Eastern Africa displaced communities and damaged infrastructure.
The AU called for immediate, coordinated action, including stronger national preparedness plans, climate-resilient agriculture, protection of water resources and critical infrastructure, and expanded early-warning systems reaching villages, farmers and pastoralists. Regional Economic Communities, the African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development and national meteorological services will play a central role in converting forecasts into practical action.
The emphasis on African-led coordination also supports wider continental climate diplomacy ahead of COP31 and preparations for COP32, allowing African states to approach adaptation and loss-and-damage discussions from a position of organised demand rather than reactive appeal.
Geopolitical Context
The El Niño threat is emerging amid elevated global tensions. Fuel and fertiliser shortages linked to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have already increased input costs for African agriculture, compounding domestic fiscal constraints and climate exposure. This reinforces the case for diversified partnerships and reducing reliance on single-source supplies.
At the same time, the crisis provides an opportunity for greater African agency in climate diplomacy. Prioritising anticipatory action, regional early-warning systems and increased adaptation finance could position the continent as a source of practical solutions rather than a passive recipient of aid. Cooperation with institutions including the AfDB, African Risk Capacity and regional climate centres further strengthen Africa’s negotiating position.
Outlook
The developing El Niño is an immediate risk rather than a distant possibility. Conditions are already present and are expected to strengthen through the southern-hemisphere summer. The combination of projected intensity, regional climate signals and existing vulnerabilities is likely to test food systems, public finances and stability mechanisms across several parts of Africa simultaneously.
The severity of the eventual impact will depend largely on the speed and scale of anticipatory action. Investment in resilient infrastructure, timely dissemination of forecasts to farmers and local authorities, and coordinated regional contingency planning could reduce the duration and severity of impacts. The institutional mechanisms for such action are already in place; the key test is whether resources and political attention will match the scientific warning before peak conditions arrive in late 2026 and early 2027.
