Security Implications Of Tanzania’s Expanding Controls On Media And Digital Space
Tanzania’s recent tightening of restrictions on media and digital platforms extends beyond civil-liberties considerations and has wide-ranging security implications across political, socio-economic, cyber, and diplomatic spheres. On 18 August 2025, a court order prohibited live coverage of opposition leader Tundu Lissu’s treason trial, banning live streaming, broadcasting, and online distribution. This ruling illustrates the state’s preference for information control during politically sensitive moments. While it restricts independent scrutiny of a capital-case trial of clear public interest, it also diminishes perceptions of judicial transparency and may reinforce narratives of impunity, thereby undermining institutional legitimacy in the lead-up to the October 2025 elections.
Sustained information controls increase the risk of polarisation and episodic unrest, a pattern already observed in neighbouring Kenya. The government’s decision to block access to X (formerly Twitter) since May 2025 curtailed a significant platform for grievance articulation, mobilisation, and rapid verification of information. Lissu’s arrest followed his social media activity on X, which occurred shortly after a cyber incident targeting official accounts. Authorities justified the platform’s restriction on security grounds; however, prolonged denial of access risks displacing contention from digital spaces to physical spaces, raising the probability of protests and encouraging the use of encrypted communication channels that are less visible to security agencies. This dynamic complicates enforcement, potentially criminalises lawful political activity, and heightens the likelihood of confrontations with security forces around the October 2025 polls, with an increased risk of post-election disputes should results be contested.
Information Environment and Disinformation Risks
Restrictions on media coverage and selective platform bans also produce secondary security effects by generating information vacuums. In such contexts, rumours, conspiracy narratives, and disinformation—whether domestic or foreign—gain traction, as independent verification channels are curtailed. This phenomenon was evident following the May 2025 cyberattack, where official explanations linking platform restrictions to security concerns coexisted with allegations of politically motivated silencing, undermining public trust in state communications during crises.
The reported removal of over 80,000 online platforms in May 2025 further narrowed the information space and discouraged journalists, content creators, and civic actors from publishing reliable reporting. From a security perspective, this reduces the open-source intelligence available to authorities, which is often instrumental in gauging public sentiment, detecting escalation signals, and pre-empting violence. By forcing political discourse into closed networks, the measures create uncertainty for both civic actors and security agencies, a condition known to increase the risk of self-fulfilling escalation.
Socio-Economic and Human-Rights Dimensions
Human-rights concerns intersect directly with external security cooperation, investment flows, and diplomatic engagement. In 2025, United Nations Special Procedures highlighted alleged enforced disappearances and torture of political opponents, raising the risk of targeted sanctions and complicating security-sector partnerships. Such allegations also encourage stricter human-rights due-diligence by financial institutions and corporations. The European Parliament’s resolution calling for Lissu’s release, which was met with a sovereignty-based rebuttal from Tanzanian authorities, illustrates how electoral-period restrictions are already influencing relations with international partners. These dynamics can elevate sovereign risk perceptions, depress tourism demand, delay donor-supported governance initiatives, and constrain fiscal space, with implications for funding core security functions.
Domestically, the legal basis for media regulation remains embedded in the 2016 Media Services Act, which continues to facilitate suspensions and content restrictions despite partial reforms. This entrenched structural imbalance between state authorities and independent media incentivises self-censorship, weakens oversight of procurement and security forces, and reduces accountability across public institutions. Reduced accountability heightens the risk of corruption, erodes service delivery, and fosters grievances that can trigger protest and episodic unrest around issues such as pricing, land disputes, or policing practices.
Regional Security Considerations
Cross-border security dynamics also warrant consideration. Reports that foreign activists monitoring Lissu’s case were abducted and assaulted—allegations contested by the government—have mobilised transnational advocacy networks and could result in litigation in regional courts. If substantiated, such incidents risk reputational damage to Tanzania’s rule-of-law credentials, potential travel advisories, and constraints on judicial and police cooperation. They also carry the potential to strain relations with neighbouring states, introducing avoidable volatility into bilateral ties important for trade, migration, and regional security operations.
Digital Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
In the cyber domain, Tanzania exhibits a mixed posture. While assertive in restricting access to platforms, the state has demonstrated vulnerabilities in its own digital infrastructure. Such conditions encourage copycat intrusions and propaganda hacks, as adversaries may perceive gaps in detection and resilience. In a restricted information environment, successful intrusions can generate disproportionate political impact. This dynamic risks creating a cycle in which each breach justifies further restrictions, amplifying the significance of subsequent cyber incidents. A more sustainable approach would involve developing transparent, credible incident-response mechanisms and protecting independent verification channels, both of which contribute positively to security.
Net Assessment and Medium-Term Outlook
Tanzania’s expanding restrictions on media and digital platforms are likely to: undermine trust in state institutions and official communications; increase the probability of protest flashpoints and heavy-handed policing during the October 2025 polls; facilitate the spread of disinformation; heighten risk perceptions among international partners; and incentivise adversarial cyber activity in an information-constrained environment. In the medium term, these measures may weaken accountability, elevate corruption exposure, and impose reputational costs that could constrain economic recovery and security-sector reform. These outcomes are not predetermined and depend on political choices and the effectiveness of legal and oversight institutions.
Key indicators to monitor from the pre-election period through the first quarter of 2026—in addition to Lissu’s treason trial outcome—include regulatory developments restricting coverage of trials, rallies, or vote-tabulation; recurrence of cyber intrusions and platform restrictions; frequency and management of demonstrations; reports of enforced disappearances or arbitrary detention; and external responses from the European Union, Commonwealth institutions, or multilateral lenders.
Overall, Tanzania’s current approach may provide incumbents with short-term control of information flows but carries measurable costs to internal stability, cyber resilience, institutional legitimacy, and external partnerships. A recalibrated approach, centred on transparent legal processes, accountable policing, and proportionate cyber management, would improve both immediate stability during the 2025 elections and the country’s longer-term security outlook.
