Introduction
Building upon the foundational analyses in this series—where Article 1 defined the composition and evolution of BRICS and the West, Article 2 examined their internal dynamics and tensions, Article 3 explored the historical context amid Africa’s colonial legacy, and Article 4 delineated the economic, political, and strategic stakes for Africa—this fifth instalment delves into the geopolitical contest unfolding on the continent. As BRICS, now comprising 11 members including African nations such as South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia, positions itself as a counterweight to Western dominance, great power competition intensifies across Africa. This rivalry, primarily between Western powers (led by the United States and European Union) and BRICS heavyweights (China and Russia), manifests in economic investments, security partnerships, and diplomatic manoeuvres. From an African perspective, this contest presents both opportunities for leveraging rivalries to advance development and risks of entrenchment in proxy conflicts, underscoring the imperative for African agency through frameworks like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Agenda 2063.
With Africa’s projected population growth to 2.5-billion by 2050 and its vast mineral resources critical for global green transitions, the continent has become a pivotal arena for influence. However, African states are not passive actors; initiatives like AfCFTA, which aims to boost intra-African trade to 52% by 2045, enable strategic diversification, mitigating over-reliance on external powers.
Economic Competition: Infrastructure, Trade, and Resource Control
The economic domain forms the core of great power rivalry in Africa, where investments in infrastructure, trade agreements, and resource extraction serve as tools for long-term influence. BRICS nations, particularly China, have surged ahead with initiatives emphasising rapid development and non-interference, contrasting with Western approaches often tied to governance conditionalities.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains a cornerstone of BRICS engagement, having invested over USD 200-billion in African infrastructure by 2025, focusing on ports, railways, and energy projects. This includes the Lobito Corridor in Angola, connecting Atlantic ports to mineral-rich regions, enhancing China’s access to critical minerals like cobalt and lithium essential for electric vehicles and renewables. Russia complements this through agricultural and energy deals, such as wheat supplies to drought-affected nations and nuclear power agreements in countries like Egypt and Rwanda. The expanded BRICS framework, post-2024 additions, facilitates de-dollarisation efforts, with trade in local currencies reducing Africa’s vulnerability to Western financial volatility.
In response, Western powers have ramped up initiatives to counter this influence. The EU’s Global Gateway, launched in 2021, has mobilised EUR 150-billion for African projects by 2025, emphasising sustainable infrastructure in digital, energy, and transport sectors. This includes 138 flagship projects adopted between 2023 and 2025, such as renewable energy hubs in North Africa and digital connectivity in sub-Saharan regions. The US, through Prosper Africa and the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), has invested USD 50-billion in private sector-led projects, targeting critical minerals with a USD 50-million equity stake in digital infrastructure firms like Cassava Technologies. These efforts aim to secure supply chains amid US-China tensions, with Africa holding 30% of global critical minerals.
This competition has spurred a “new scramble for Africa,” where economic engagements often prioritise strategic gains over local benefits. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chinese firms control 80% of cobalt mines, while US initiatives seek to diversify supply chains. African states, however, are asserting agency: Nigeria’s rejection of certain BRI loans and Ethiopia’s balanced partnerships exemplify efforts to negotiate better terms, aligning with Agenda 2063’s focus on industrialisation.
Expansion Strategies: BRICS and Western Approaches to Gaining Influence in Africa
As great power competition escalates, both BRICS and Western entities employ targeted expansion strategies to enhance their footholds in Africa. These approaches, while offering developmental opportunities, often reflect broader geopolitical ambitions, prompting African states to prioritise sovereignty and equitable benefits in their engagements.
Within BRICS, China leads with infrastructure-driven expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), channelling investments into projects that secure access to Africa’s resources, such as minerals and commodities, while generating revenue through loans and contracts. By 2025, this has resulted in over USD 200-billion in funding for transport and energy infrastructure, often in exchange for resource concessions, strengthening China’s domestic economy and global supply chains. Russia focuses on security and energy sectors, providing military aid, training, and equipment to coup-affected nations in the Sahel, while securing energy deals like uranium mining in Niger and oil exploration in Libya. This strategy not only bolsters Russia’s influence amid Western sanctions but also ensures resource flows for its energy needs. Other BRICS members contribute variably: India emphasises pharmaceuticals and technology transfers, Brazil promotes agricultural cooperation, and South Africa, as an African member, facilitates intra-BRICS ties to amplify continental voices in global forums. The group’s overall expansion, including new African members like Egypt and Ethiopia, aims at fostering south-south solidarity, de-dollarisation, and alternative financial institutions like the New Development Bank to reduce Western dominance.
Western strategies, led by the US and EU, counter this through a mix of economic diplomacy, conditional investments, and alliances. The US employs initiatives like Prosper Africa and the DFC to mobilise private sector capital, focusing on critical minerals and digital infrastructure to secure supply chains and diminish reliance on Chinese sources. In 2025, this includes summits and bilateral trade deals emphasising prosperity and power projection, such as investments in rare earth metals to balance China and Russia. The EU’s Global Gateway allocates EUR 150-billion to Africa by 2025, half of its total, for sustainable projects in green energy and connectivity, often tied to governance reforms and environmental standards to promote democratic values and counter authoritarian influences. Both emphasise partnerships with African private sectors and multilateral forums, while coordinating with allies like Turkey to offset Chinese and Russian gains in regions like North Africa and the Sahel. However, these strategies face challenges from perceptions of neo-colonialism, as Western influence declines amid rising non-Western actors.
From an African lens, these expansion tactics highlight opportunities for technology transfers and funding, but also risks of dependency and resource exploitation. African nations, through AU mechanisms, seek to negotiate balanced terms, leveraging competition to advance Agenda 2063 goals.
Security and Military Engagements: From Proxy Conflicts to Partnerships
Security represents another frontline in the geopolitical contest, with BRICS and Western powers vying for military footholds amid Africa’s instability hotspots, such as the Sahel and Horn of Africa.
Russia has significantly expanded its influence in the Sahel following coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which led to the expulsion of French and US forces in 2025. Through the Africa Corps (successor to Wagner Group), Russia provides military training, equipment, and intelligence, securing access to minerals like gold and uranium in exchange. The August 2025 military summit in Moscow with Sahel juntas formalised this partnership, including joint operations against jihadist threats. China, under its Global Security Initiative, has increased peacekeeping contributions and arms sales, establishing a naval base in Djibouti to protect trade routes.
Western responses include US AFRICOM’s counterterrorism operations, with bases in Niger (now relocated) and drone strikes in Somalia, alongside EU naval missions in the Gulf of Guinea. The US has renewed partnerships, such as with Mali for anti-terrorism efforts post-2024 elections. However, perceptions of neo-colonialism persist, as highlighted in Article 3, prompting African states to diversify: the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) balances Russian support with AU-led peacekeeping.
This rivalry risks exacerbating proxy conflicts, as seen in Sudan where Western-backed factions clash with Russian-supported militias. Yet, it also empowers African agency: South Africa’s mediation in regional disputes leverages its BRICS membership for neutral diplomacy.
Diplomatic and Soft Power Influences: Shaping Narratives and Institutions
Diplomatically, the contest extends to multilateral forums and soft power, where BRICS advocates for Global South reforms, while the West upholds existing structures.
BRICS’ 2025 Rio Summit emphasised de-dollarisation and UN reforms, amplifying African voices through members like Ethiopia. China’s summits, such as the 2025 Changsha Forum attended by nearly all African nations, pledge support for Agenda 2063, fostering anti-Western narratives. Russia’s cultural exchanges and media outlets like RT counter Western dominance in information flows.
The West counters via summits like the US-Africa Business Forum and EU-AU partnerships, promoting democratic values and human rights. Initiatives like the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure rival BRI, though with slower rollout. African multilateral bodies, such as the AU and ECOWAS, navigate this by advocating reforms in the WTO and UN, avoiding binary alignments.
Soft power dynamics highlight education and media: Chinese scholarships outnumber Western ones in some regions, while US cultural exports maintain appeal.
Implications for African Self-Reliance
Amid this contest, Africa’s drive for self-reliance remains paramount. AfCFTA and Agenda 2063 enable the continent to extract concessions, such as technology transfers from both blocs. However, risks include debt traps from BRICS loans and conditional aid from the West, potentially fragmenting regional unity as seen in ECOWAS withdrawals. By prioritising Pan-African solutions, like the AU’s Silencing the Guns initiative, Africa can transform competition into catalysts for sovereignty.
Conclusion
The geopolitical contest in Africa, characterised by economic investments, security partnerships, and diplomatic manoeuvres, reflects a broader shift towards multipolarity. While BRICS offers alternatives to Western models, the rivalry underscores Africa’s strategic position to advance development through diversified engagements. This analysis sets the stage for the next phase of the series, beginning with country-level alignments, to further explore how individual African nations position themselves in this dynamic landscape.
